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THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE: “AN AVANT-GARDE TOOL FOR 
HUMAN RIGHTS” OR A CAMOFLAGED CURSE? 
 
Candra Connelly 
I. INTRODUCTION  
The Alien Tort Statute1 (“ATS”) was enacted into federal law in 1789 
and confers courts of federal jurisdiction the ability to hear lawsuits filed 
by non-US citizens for torts committed in violation of international law:2 
“[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action 
by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations 
or a treaty of the United States.”3 Prior to the enactment of ATS, “a 
nation became responsible under the law of nations for injuries that its 
citizens inflicted on aliens if it failed to provide adequate means of 
redress . . . .”4 Over the last half-century, claims brought under the ATS 
have involved violations of international law stemming from murder and 
torture to the funding of international terror regimes.5 However, what 
was meant to provide aliens with redress has, over the last decade or so, 
left everyone questioning the power of the Act and the correct method of 
its application. Adhikari v. Kellogg Brown & Root is the latest case that 
has left the legal community scratching its head as it absorbs the Fifth 
Circuit’s decision on how to apply the ATS.6 In the Fifth Circuit’s 
January 2017 decision, the court outright rejected the Fourth Circuit’s 
analysis in Al Shimari v. CACI Premium Tech., Inc.7 when it came to the 
statute’s extraterritorial application and these two circuits are not the 
only ones at odds when it comes to a permissible application.8 
The Alien Tort Statute has already had its day in the Supreme Court, 
but it looks as if the Court may be seeing it again shortly, as circuit 
courts around the country look to the Supreme Court for clarification. 
This article will address the most recent circuit split, considering the 
 
 1. The Alien Tort Statute, THE CTR. FOR JUST. & ACCOUNTABILITY (2016), http://cja.org/what-
we-do/litigation/legal-strategy/the-alien-tort-statute/.  
 2. Id. 
 3. 28 U.S.C. §1350 (1948). 
 4. Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Alien Tort Statute and the Law of Nations, 78 
U. Chi. L. Rev. 445, 450 (2011). 
 5. See Sosa v. Alvarez- Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). See also Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 
F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 2014). The Supreme Court addressed ATS claims for the first time in Sosa, when a 
Mexican national brought an ATS claim after DEA agents had kidnapped him in Mexico and brought 
him to the U.S. to stand trial for the murder of a DEA agent. 
 6. 845 F.3d 184 (5th Cir. 2017). 
 7. 758 F.3d 516 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 8. Numerous other circuits are also conflicted when it comes to applying aspects of case law to 
ATS claims. 
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Fifth and Fourth Circuit’s extraterritorial applications of the ATS. It will 
conclude that the Fourth Circuit has the more viable interpretation of the 
statute itself, and ultimately state what the test should look like going 
forward. Part II of this article will provide background knowledge of the 
cases that have stumped the circuits in this jurisdictional application 
process. Part III will address the issues, break down the best possible 
application of the statute and its extraterritorial component, and provide 
insight into what an application of the ATS may look like going 
forward. Lastly part IV will provide closing thoughts regarding what we 
may see shortly from the Supreme Court. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. ATS and the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality  
Enacted in 1789, the general connotation was that the Alien Tort 
Statute would serve as a jurisdictional bridge for non-US citizens to 
bring a cause of action against those residing in the U.S. who violated 
various aspects of international law, specifically involving implications 
of human rights.9 Under the ATS, for a cause of action to be viable 
against an individual, that individual must live in or frequently visit the 
U.S.10 This ATS requirement cannot be deduced from the statute, but it 
has been applied in over a decade’s worth of common law, and is not 
usually a topic of discussion in an ATS case because it is not typically 
disputed. 
The ATS was a generally unnoticed and underutilized portion of 
federal law until around 1980, when a Paraguayan doctor and his 
daughter filed suit under the ATS against a former Paraguayan police 
officer living in New York City.11 The suit was for allegedly kidnapping 
and torturing members of their family in retaliation for their family’s 
opposition to the Paraguayan government.12 The Second Circuit 
ultimately observed that torture violates international law and thus a 
valid claim existed for these facts under the ATS.13 
From the moment that the Second Circuit enunciated the types of 
claims viable under the ATS, plaintiffs began to place an increased 
sense of reliance on the statute, especially when it came to seeking 
 
 9. The Alien Tort Statute, supra note 1. 
 10. Id.  
 11. Filartiga v. Peña- Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2nd Cir. 1980) 
 12. Amy Howe, An Introduction to the Alien Tort Statute and corporate liability: In Plain 
English, SCOTUS blog (July 24, 2017), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/07/introduction-alien-tort-
statute-corporate-liability-plain-english/. See Filartiga v. Peña- Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2nd Cir. 1980).  
 13. Id.  
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redress from human rights violations occurring overseas. Judge Henry 
Friendly went on to describe the ATS as a “‘kind of legal Lohengrin,’ 
after a mythical German knight who arrives in a boat pulled by swans, 
because ‘no one seems to know whence it came.’”14 
After numerous successful cases were brought under the ATS, many 
of which resulted from conduct occurring overseas, defendants began to 
push back. Chief Justice John Roberts referred to plaintiffs evoking the 
ATS as attempting to make the U.S. the “‘moral custodian’ of the 
world.”15 As a result of this analogy, in 2004 the Supreme Court 
indicated that the kinds of claims that were to be viable under the ATS 
going forward were to be relatively limited.16 While the ATS was 
originally used to remedy international wrongs, the Supreme Court 
further clarified that the ATS is only a statute that confers jurisdiction to 
federal courts to hear cases alleging international human rights violation 
and that it is not a tool that provides a cause of action for specific 
alleged wrongdoings.17 
i. Going Forward 
Along with the Court’s interpretation that the ATS only provides 
jurisdiction for claims to be brought in U.S. federal courts, a test to 
whether those claims should go forward was also enunciated. It was 
found that ATS claims should only proceed if they are widely accepted 
as violations of international norms or violations of international law 
that are paradigms to causes of action that existed under international 
law18 at the time of ATS’s enactment.19 
“[T]he determination whether a norm is sufficiently definite [or a 
widely accepted violation of international law] to support a cause of 
action . . . involve[s] an element of judgment about what the practical 
consequences of ‘allowing litigants to rely on that norm’” are.20 When it 
comes to deciding whether a violation is a paradigm to a cause of action 
that existed at ATS enactment, a court should be in tune with the norm 
and what remedy that cause of action provides.21 
 
 14. Id.  
 15. Id.  
 16. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 720. 
 17. Howe, supra note 12. 
 18. Violation of safe conducts, infringement of rights of ambassadors, and piracy. See Sosa, 542 
U.S. at 715. 
 19. Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 525. 
 20. Howe, supra note 12. 
 21. Id.  
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ii. The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality  
The presumption that a statute does not have an extraterritorial 
application is a “longstanding principal of American law ‘that 
legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to 
apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.’”22 
This idea is based upon the notion that “Congress ordinarily legislates 
with respect to domestic, not foreign matters.”23 In other words, if a 
statute is to be applied extraterritorially, Congress must give clear 
indication that the specific statute is intended to have an extraterritorial 
reach. 
The purpose of the presumption is that it “serves to protect against 
unintended clashes between our laws and those of nations which could 
result in international discord.”24 While the stated purpose may seem 
legitimate, case law suggests that not all exceptions are clear, 
specifically regarding statutes enacted by Congress that reference 
international matters and conduct. The presumption against 
extraterritoriality has been at the core of numerous landmark Supreme 
Court decisions within the twenty-first century and is crucial to a correct 
application of the ATS.25 
iii. An Extraterritorial Debate 
The Supreme Court has been asked numerous times in the last decade 
to provide a viable, non-ambiguous interpretation of the ATS’s 
extraterritorial application. Other statutes that implicate questions of 
international law have had the same difficulty in finding a correct test to 
ensure that the statute applies extraterritorially.26 Adhikari’s outright 
rejection of Al Shimari’s application of the ATS is the perfect example 
to indicate that the Supreme Court has yet to enunciate a bright line 
application of the rule. 
 
 22. EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v. 
Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)). 
 23. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010). See also Smith v. United 
States, 507 U.S. 197, 204 (1993). 
 24. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petro. Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013) (quoting EEOC, 499 U.S. at 248 
(1991)). 
 25. See generally Morrison, 561 U.S. 247 (2010); Kiobel, 569 U.S. 108 (2013); RJR Nabisco v. 
European Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090 (2016). 
 26. See §10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and portions of the Racketeer Influenced 
and Corrupt Organizations Act. 
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a. Morrison v. Nat’l Aust. Bank Ltd.:27 the Supreme Court’s Initial 
Guidance on the Presumption 
In 1998, National Australian Bank (“National”) acquired Homeside 
Lending, Inc., an American Company.28 Three years later, National 
announced that it would incur a $450 million write-down for 
inaccurately calculating the fees that Homeside would generate for 
servicing mortgages.29 As a result of the write-down, stock prices 
dropped.30 Later the same year, National again announced that they had 
inaccurately calculated, this time leading to a $1.75 billion write-down 
and a further drop in stock price.31 This lawsuit was brought as result of 
that loss by three plaintiffs representing a class of non-American 
purchasers of National stock.32 
The district court found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over 
the non-American purchasers because the acts that occurred in the U.S. 
were “at most, a link in the chain of an alleged overall securities fraud 
scheme that culminated abroad.”33 The Second Circuit affirmed the 
finding that the acts performed in the U.S. did not “‘compris[e] the heart 
of the alleged fraud.’”34 In other words, if the fraud itself had occurred 
in the U.S., rather than just the plan to carry out the acts, and those acts 
were the specific acts leading to losses for foreign investors, proper 
jurisdiction may have existed. “[T]he focus of the [Securities] Exchange 
Act [of 1934] is not upon the place where the deception originated, but 
upon purchases and sales of securities in the United States.”35 With this 
particular set of facts, the court concluded that the issuance of fraudulent 
statements from National’s headquarters in Australia were more central 
to the fraud than the manipulation of the financial statements in the U.S., 
thus the focus of the statute and the location where the conduct occurred 
never intersected, failing to displace the presumption.36  
On a writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court noted that the question to 
be decided was “whether §10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act 
provided a cause of action to foreign plaintiffs suing for misconduct in 
 
 27. 561 U.S. 247. 
 28. Id. at 251. 
 29. Id. at 252. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 253. 
 33. Morrsion, 561 U.S. at 253 (quoting In re National Australia Bank Securities Litig., No. 03 
Civ. 6537 (BSJ), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94162 at *8 (Oct. 25, 2006)). 
 34. Id., (quoting Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167 (2d. Cir. 2008)). 
 35. Id. at 266. 
 36. Id. at 268-73. 
5
Connelly: The Alien Tort Statute: “An Avant-Garde Tool for Human Rights” or
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2018
208 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 87 
connection with securities traded on foreign exchanges.”37  
The Supreme Court found that the Second Circuit had exercised the 
presumption against extraterritoriality from the jurisprudence of §10(b) 
and replaced it with the inquiry as to whether it would be reasonable38 to 
apply a statute to different factual scenarios.39 Essentially the Second 
Circuit had established two tests: the “effects test” of whether the 
wrongful conduct had a substantial effect in the U.S. or upon U.S. 
citizens; and the “conduct test” of whether the wrongful conduct 
occurred in the U.S. The Second Circuit explained that these two tests 
should not separate from one another on the ground that a combination 
of the two gives a better picture as to whether there is sufficient U.S. 
involvement to justify jurisdiction.40  
The main issue with the Second Circuit’s long time and widely 
accepted test is that it can be interpreted to mean that Congressional 
silence leaves this issue open to interpretation by courts or that Congress 
was satisfied with this interpretation.41 This line of thinking, while 
allowing courts to construe statutes liberally, could also provide many 
detrimental effects. In response, the Supreme Court found that “rather 
than guess anew in each case, we apply the presumption in all cases, 
preserving a stable background against which Congress can legislate 
with predictable effects.”42 In this situation, §10(b) contained nothing to 
suggest that an extraterritorial application was applicable, and thus the 
court would not infer it.43 The Supreme Court further announced the 
creation of a transactional test, applicable to defining the reach of §10(b) 
of the Securities Exchange Act.44 Under this test, the provision would 
only extend to “transactions in securities listed on domestic exchanges . 
. . and domestic transactions in other securities,” thereby confining the 
reach to the statutory text.45 While the transactional test was to cover 
§10(b) matters, the Court adopted the “focus” test as the method of 
establishing whether there was an extraterritorial application. 
In his concurrence, Justice Stevens claimed the majority 
“impermissibly narrowed the inquiry in evaluating whether the statute 
applies abroad.”46 He insisted that the Second Circuit refined its tests 
overtime, with tacit approval from Congress, the Commissioner, and 
 
 37. Id. at 250-51. 
 38. and therefore, exemplifying Congressional intent. 
 39. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 257. 
 40. Id. at 257-58. 
 41. Id. at 261. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 262. 
 44. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 274. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 265 (J. Stevens concurring). 
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sister circuits, and that “‘[t]he longstanding acceptance by the courts, 
coupled with Congress’ failure to reject [its] reasonable interpretation of 
the workings of §10(b) . . . argues significantly in favor of acceptance of 
the [Second Circuit] rule by this court.’”47 He argued that the majority 
sought to transfer the presumption from a flexible rule to a clear 
statement of law and that simply is not a correct application.48 
b. Adding to Extraterritoriality: Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petro Co.49 
In 2013, the Supreme Court took Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petro. Co. 
under advisement after the Second Circuit dismissed the complaint 
based on an assumption that corporations cannot be held liable under the 
ATS because “the law of nations does not recognize corporate 
liability.”50 In Kiobel, Nigerian nationals sued Dutch, British, and 
Nigerian corporations, alleging that they aided and abetted the Nigerian 
military in committing international law violations. Specifically, 
petitioners argued that they, or their relatives, were killed, tortured, 
unlawfully detained, deprived of their property, and forced into exile by 
the Nigerian government, and that the respondents were complicit in 
these acts of violence and international injustice.51 The Supreme Court 
agreed to issue a writ of certiorari; not to decide whether corporations 
were susceptible to ATS claims, but instead to decide whether claims 
consisting of conduct that primarily occurred abroad can be brought 
under the statute.52 
In Chief Justice Robert’s opinion, he found “that the principals 
underlying the general presumption that U.S. law does not apply outside 
of the United States extend[s] fully to the ATS.”53 In making this 
statement, the Chief Justice reinforced the principal that statutes 
ordinarily do not apply extraterritorially without explicit Congressional 
intent. While concluding that the presumption against extraterritoriality 
barred this specific ATS claim because all relevant conduct took place 
outside of the U.S., the court stated that even if the claims were to 
“touch and concern” the U.S. with sufficient force, the mere presence of 
a corporation was not sufficient to overcome the threshold.54 The court 
 
 47. Id. at 278 (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 733 (1975)). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Kiobel, 569 U.S. 108 (2013). 
 50. Id. at 114. 
 51. Id. at 113-14. 
 52. Howe, supra note 12. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 125. 
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thus created an exception55 by enunciating that ATS can create 
jurisdiction when “claims touch and concern56 the territory of the United 
States . . . with sufficient force to displace the presumption against 
extraterritorial application.”57 While articulating the exception, the court 
failed to provide a workable way for the lower courts to apply this 
“test.”58 
c. A Final Take? RJR Nabisco v. European Cmty.59 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Kiobel left the legal community 
wondering which test governs the extraterritorial analysis, the “focus” 
test60 or the “touch and concern” test.61 The Supreme Court stated in 
RJR Nabisco that “. . . for ATS claims, ‘[i]f the conduct relevant to the 
statute’s [ATS’s] focus occurred in the United States, then the case 
involves a permissible domestic application even if other conduct 
occurred abroad.”62 In other words, if the relevant conduct63 occurred in 
a foreign country, the case involves an impermissible extraterritorial 
application, regardless of conduct that occurred in the U.S., ultimately 
resulting in a claim that is categorically barred.64 The relevant conduct 
must intersect with the focus of the statute in question for there to be a 
cognizable extraterritorial application of the statute without an explicit 
showing of Congressional intent. Meaning, the “focus” test and the 
“touch and concern” test are, for ATS extraterritorial purposes, the same 
test.65 
The European Community66 and twenty-six of its member states 
originally brought suit against RJR Nabisco (RJR) in the Eastern District 
of New York in 2000,67 alleging that RJR directed, managed, and 
controlled a global money laundering enterprise in violation of the 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) statute.68 
 
 55. Id. at 124-25. 
 56. Becomes known in future cases as the “touch and concern” language. 
 57. 569 U.S. at 124-25. 
 58. The “touch and concern” language is a key point in many extraterritorial analyses. 
 59. 136 S. Ct. 2090. 
 60. As enunciated in Morrison. 
 61. As stated in Kiobel. 
 62. 136 S.Ct. at 2101. 
 63. Relevant conduct is conduct that occurred in violation of part of some international law. 
 64. 136 S. Ct. at 2101. 
 65. Clarifying Kiobel’s “Touch and Concern Test”, 130 Harv. L. Rev. 1902, 1911-12 (2017). 
 66. Formally the European Economic Community (”EEC”), a regional organization aimed at 
bringing about economic integration in its member states. EEC was renamed European Community 
upon the formation of the European Union and is not incorporated. 
 67. 136 S. Ct. at 2098. 
 68. Id. 
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This violation allegedly occurred as a result of Columbian and Russian 
criminal organizations importing illegal drugs into European countries, 
selling them, and laundering money back to the organizations’ home 
countries.69 The money from selling the illegal drugs was then used to 
pay for large shipments of RJR cigarettes to Europe.70 
The district court dismissed the action based on the presumption 
against extraterritoriality.71 The Second Circuit reversed and held that 
claims under RICO can apply extraterritorially when a RICO claim is in 
violation of a predicate statute that Congress clearly intended to have an 
extraterritorial application.72 
Justice Alito stated that sections of RICO have an extraterritorial 
application to rebut the presumption, which is expressed by clear 
indication from Congress in predicate statutes.73 Sections of the RICO 
text specifically define certain racketeering offenses as ones that occur 
outside of the U.S., thereby displacing the presumption.74 However, 
according to the Court, not all foreign enterprises qualify to rebut the 
presumption in these instances.75 The enterprise must directly affect 
commerce involving the U.S. in order for this part of RICO to apply.76 If 
RICO does apply, in order for the lawsuit to proceed, a plaintiff must 
allege domestic injury.77 In this case, all alleged injuries by plaintiffs 
were suffered abroad and thus the Court found that the district court 
correctly dismissed the case.78 While an impermissible application of 
ATS was found in this case, RJR provided the Supreme Court with an 
opportunity to clarify what exactly the test is for conducting an 
extraterritorial analysis and provided an opportunity to reiterate that 
Morrison’s focus test still governs.79 
Accordingly, the Court stated that in evaluating whether a claim 
involves a permissible extraterritorial application, a court must first look 
at whether the presumption has been rebutted by clear and affirmative 
indication80 that the statute applies extraterritorially, and second, if there 
 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 2099. 
 72. RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2102. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 2101. 
 75. Id. at 2105. 
 76. Id. at 2094. 
 77. RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2095. 
 78. Id. at 2111. 
 79. Perlette Jura & Dylan Mefford, Extraterritoriality: The ATS in Focus, LAW360 (Oct. 25, 
2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/855264/extraterritoriality-the-ats-in-focus.  
 80. Clear and affirmative evidence could be direct, written authorization with the statute, 
authorizing an extraterritorial application.  
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is no such indication, a court must ask whether the claim involves a 
domestic application of the statute’s focus.81 Essentially, if the conduct 
that is relevant to the statute’s focus occurs on U.S. soil, an allowable 
domestic application of the statute exists, even if other conduct occurred 
abroad. Alternatively, if all of the conduct occurred abroad, a court does 
not even have to consider the statute’s focus before dismissing the 
case.82 
B. No Clear Consensus: Recent Split Over Extraterritorial Application 
of ATS 
i. Al Shimari v. CACI Premium Technology  
The Fourth Circuit has heard this case four times since 200883 and 
there is no indication that a final decision is forthcoming, without an 
eventual ruling from the Supreme Court.84 Originally filed in 2008, the 
Center for Constitutional Rights brought suit on behalf of four Iraqi 
torture victims against CACI International Inc. and CACI Premium 
Technology, two U.S. based government contractors.85 The complaint 
alleged that the defendants’ directed and participated in illegal conduct, 
including torture, at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, where they were 
hired by the U.S. to provide interrogation services.86 Numerous issues 
arose during this case, including issues of proper jurisdiction and 
questions of justiciability.87 While originally dismissed on remand after 
the release of the Kiobel decision, due to all incidents alleged occurring 
in Iraq, dismissal was later overturned.88 
On the Fourth Circuit’s third hearing of the case,89 it interpreted that 
the Supreme Court’s broadly stated usage of the word “claims”90 
allowed the court jurisdiction.91 It interpreted the word “claim” to have 
the meaning given by Black’s Law Dictionary, as the “aggregate of 
 
 81. Jura, supra note 80. 
 82. Id. 
 83. 658 F.3d 413 (4th Cir. 2011); 679 F.3d 205 (4th Cir. 2012); 758 F.3d 516 (4th Cir. 2014); 
840 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 2016). 
 84. Most recently, the defense filed a renewed motion to dismiss, which was denied from the 
bench on September 22, 2017. 
 85. Al Shimari v. CACI et al., CTR. FOR CONST. RTS. (Sept. 26, 2017), 
https://ccrjustice.org/home/what-we-do/our-cases/al-shimari-v-caci-et-al.  
 86. 658 F.3d at 415-417.  
 87. See all 4 of the Fourth Circuit opinions in this case [listed above]. 
 88. 758 F.3d at 520. 
 89. Id. at 516.  
 90. As discussed in Kiobel. 
 91. 758 F.3d at 527. 
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operative facts giving rise to a right enforceable by a court.”92 Under this 
rationale, the broad definition of the word “‘claims,’ rather than the 
alleged tortious conduct, must touch and concern United States territory 
with sufficient force,” suggesting that in application, courts must 
consider all facts that give rise to an ATS claim, including the parties’ 
identities and their relationship to the cause of action.93 In essence, this 
court read the “touch and concern” language to contemplate a fact-based 
analysis to determine whether particular ATS claims displace the 
presumption.94 
In his Kiobel concurrence, Justice Breyer stated that this particular 
reading would allow for jurisdiction for torts occurring on American 
soil, when the defendant is an American national, or if the defendant’s 
conduct substantially and adversely affects an important American 
interest.95 This particular set of examples was likely used as part of the 
Fourth Circuit’s consideration when determining how broad the test 
should be and how far it should stretch its interpretation of the word 
“claims.” 
The presumption against extraterritoriality, under this court’s 
analysis, is not a categorical bar, but a fact-based analysis to determine 
whether courts may exercise jurisdiction over ATS claims.96 Under 
these circumstances, the plaintiffs’ claims were found to “touch and 
concern” the U.S. with sufficient force to displace the presumption 
against an extraterritorial application of ATS.97 “The plaintiffs’ claims 
reflected extensive ‘relevant conduct’ in the U.S., contrasted to the 
‘mere presence’ of foreign corporations, that was insufficient to confer 
jurisdiction in Kiobel” because all relevant conduct occurred abroad.98 
The torture committed in this instance was by U.S. citizens, whom were 
employed by a U.S. corporation, and the torture alleged occurred at a 
military base, operated by U.S. personnel.99 Allegations further insisted 
that CACI managers in the U.S. gave at least tacit approval to the acts of 
torture, attempted to cover it up, and implicitly encouraged the 
conduct.100 The Fourth Circuit further found that Congress, through 
enactment of numerous other statutes, attempted to provide aliens with 
access to U.S. courts in order to hold U.S. citizens accountable for acts 
 
 92. Id. (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 281 (9th ed. 2009)). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id.  
 95. 133 U.S. at 127 (J. Breyer concurring).  
 96. Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 527. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 528. 
 99. Id. at 528-31. 
 100. Id. at 530-31. 
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committed abroad.101 
On the latest remand, it was supposed to be determined whether or 
not this case presented a nonjusticiable political question102 because of 
potential entanglement between the judicial and executive branches.103 
The district court concluded that because a nonjusticiable political 
question was inherent in this case, due to the military’s direct control 
over interrogation operations at Abu Ghraib, the adjudication of the 
plaintiffs’ claims required the court to improperly question sensitive 
military judgments. As a result, “the court lacked any judicially 
manageable standards to resolve the plaintiff’s claims.”104 Again on 
appeal, the Fourth Circuit found that the district court erred when it 
failed to determine whether the military actually exercised control over 
any of CACI’s conduct alleged in the complaint.105 The conduct by 
CACI employees that was unlawful when committed was found by the 
Fourth Circuit to be justiciable, regardless of whether that conduct 
occurred under military control.106 Furthermore, “the fact that a military 
contractor was acting pursuant to ‘orders of the military does not, in and 
of itself, insulate the claim from judicial review.’”107  
ii. Adhikari v. Kellogg Brown & Root108 
On January 3, 2017, the Fifth Circuit released the Adhikari decision, 
stating that the claims asserted against a U.S. defense contractor, for 
injuries incurred on Iraqi soil, were not cognizable under ATS because 
they were barred by the presumption against extraterritoriality.109 The 
complaint alleged that twelve Nepali men were kidnapped and murdered 
by Iraqi insurgents while traveling through Iraq to work for a 
subcontractor on a U.S. government contract with Kellogg Brown & 
Root (KBR).110 The decedents’ survivors brought suit against KBR for 
human rights violations under the ATS, Trafficking Victims Protections, 
and Reauthorization Act (TVPRA), alleging that KBR had been 
 
 101. Al Shimari, 758 F.3d at 530-31. 
 102. While there is an inherent question as to whether ATS claims can and do present an issue of 
justiciability, that issue is well beyond the purview of this paper. 
 103. 840 F.3d at 151. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. 758 F.3d at 533. 
 108. 845 F.3d 184 (5th Cir. 2017). 
 109. Steptoe & Johnson LLP, “Fifth Circuit Rules on Extraterritoriality of ATS Claims, Creating 
Circuit Split,” Lexology (Jan. 6, 2017), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=2fedb2e3-a8bc-
4b11-a8a2-b7e14aa2423b.  
 110. 845 F.3d at 190-91. 
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involved in a human trafficking scheme that forced the decedents into 
Iraq where they were later murdered.111 The district court originally 
granted summary judgment for the defendants, holding that the 
presumption barred plaintiff’s claims.112 
On appeal, plaintiffs argued that Kiobel’s “touch and concern” 
language permitted their claims because the contract in question was 
issued and directed from the U.S., as well as supported by the U.S. 
military.113 In making these claims, plaintiffs relied on the Fourth 
Circuit’s 2014 decision in Al Shimari.114 The Fifth Circuit disagreed 
with plaintiffs’ reading of the statute, holding that Kiobel’s 
extraterritorial application and the “touch and concern” language 
required courts to analyze the “focus” of the statute at issue.115 If the 
conduct that the complaint alleged had a direct relation to the statute, 
then the statute may have an extraterritorial application.116 The Court 
moved on to pinpoint the focus of the ATS and determined that “the 
focus is conduct that violates international law.”117 The conduct alleged 
in the complaint that violated international law occurred in Iraq and thus 
the presumption barred jurisdiction, regardless of the fact that a U.S. 
government contractor was involved and personnel in the U.S. were 
aware of this trafficking scheme. 
By reaching this conclusion, the Fifth Circuit enunciated its 
interpretation on the statute’s presumption against extraterritoriality. 
First, the court must look at whether the presumption has been 
rebutted.118 For these situations, rebutted means that there has been 
clear, affirmative indication that a statute applies extraterritorially. If no 
clear, affirmative indication of extraterritorial application exists, the 
court must look to the statute’s focus.119 Step two’s “focus” inquiry 
stems from the Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison. “[W]hether the 
presumption bars a claim is not always ‘self-evidently dispositive’ 
because cases will often have at least some ‘contact with the territory of 
the United States.’”120 For that reason, the inquiry cannot stop at step 
one. The Fifth Circuit’s extraterritorial application therefore aligns with 
the Supreme Court’s RJR test.121 
 
 111. Id. at 190. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 195. 
 114. Id. at 199. 
 115. Adhikari, 840 F.3d at 199- 200. 
 116. Id. at 192. 
 117. Id. at 197. 
 118. Id. at 192. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Adhikari, 840 F.3d at 192. 
 121. Id. 
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The Fifth Circuit enunciated the previously spoken rule that the ATS 
conveys jurisdiction for a “modest number of international law 
violations” that are carved out of federal common law.122 In order for an 
ATS claim “to be cognizable, a plaintiff’s claim must be stated ‘with the 
requisite definite content and acceptance among civilized nations.’”123 
The Fifth Circuit’s adoption of this ATS approach completely 
contradicts the approach that the Fourth Circuit adopted in Al Shimari. 
The Fifth Circuit observed that the Fourth Circuit considered that “the 
claims,” rather than the alleged tortious conduct, must “touch and 
concern” the U.S. with sufficient force.124 This approach suggests that 
courts must consider all facts that give rise to an ATS claim.125 The 
plaintiffs urged that a fact-specific analysis that looks at the “totality of 
[their] claim’s connection to the U.S. territory and the national interest” 
is necessary under Kiobel.126 Plaintiffs also sought leave to amend their 
complaint in order to assert aiding and abetting claiming, in attempt to 
satisfy Al Shimari, but the court denied their request to amend, stating 
that Al Shimari is not the test.127 The Fifth Circuit sided with KBR in 
determining that Morrison’s “focus test” still governs an ATS claims 
extraterritorial application and that no evidence was presented here to 
rebut the presumption.128 
III. DISCUSSION 
A. The Fourth Circuit’s Approach as a More Viable Interpretation 
As first stated above, the Fourth and Fifth Circuits are completely at 
odds when it comes to a correct application of the ATS’s extraterritorial 
component. With no legislative history to suggest which circuit’s 
interpretation should control,129 the decision to give one interpretation 
more creditability over the other has essentially come down to a process 
of deduction and potentially even preference. 
When evaluating an ATS issue and viability of a claim, courts appear 
to often be stuck on what exactly is sufficient to displace the 
presumption and courts even seem confused as to whether the “focus” 
 
 122. Id. (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 794). 
 123. Id. (quoting Kiobel, 133 U.S. at 1663). 
 124. Id. at 193. 
 125. Adhikari, 840 F.3d at 194. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 199. 
 128. Id. at 194. 
 129. Daniel Rubin, Student Project: Aline Tort Statute: Legislative History: Home, Pace Law 
School Library Research Guides (Oct. 29, 2017), 
http://libraryguides.law.pace.edu/c.php?g=452982&p=3107679.  
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test, “touch and concern” test, a combination of the two, or neither 
controls. The Morrison court used the congressional focus of a statute as 
the sole test, but that test was communicated differently in Kiobel.130 
The Fifth Circuit in Adhikari adopted the “focus” test as a two-part 
method of analyzing ATS claims, as adopted by the Supreme Court in 
RJR, eventually concluding that the focus of the ATS and the conduct 
that occurs in the U.S. must correlate. If the focus and the conduct 
intersect, a claim is sufficient to “touch and concern” the U.S. with 
sufficient force to displace the presumption and the ATS claim may 
proceed. The Fifth Circuit’s Adhikari decision is a complete 
contradiction to the Fourth Circuit’s determination that the focus of the 
state is only one of the many factors that should be analyzed when 
determining whether an ATS claim may proceed in a U.S. federal court. 
The Fourth Circuit’s adoption of a multi-factor test131 should govern 
all current and future ATS analyses because it more closely resembles a 
textual reading of the statute and it stays true to the statute’s intended 
purpose. The purpose, which has been stated time and time again, is to 
provide a method of redress for those that have been the victims of 
violations of the laws of nations. Nowhere does the statute read that the 
conduct must take place in the U.S. In fact, that line of reasoning would 
leave many victims without a remedy and would thus go directly against 
the statutes stated purpose. 
A purely textual reading of the statute requires only “three elements 
to be present: (1) a claim must be made by aliens; (2) it must be a tort; 
and (3) the tort must be in violation of the law of nations or treaties of 
the U.S.”132 Many courts have inferred that the presumption bars a claim 
if conduct occurred overseas from: (1) the language of the statute; (2) 
Congress’ job to legislate domestically; (3) their ability to write into 
legislation that statute applies extraterritorially; and (4) their failure to 
do so in the ATS. This is an incorrect reading because Congress, in 
1789, chose to write this statute with broad language and more recently, 
the Supreme Court in Kiobel, chose to use the word “claims” instead of 
using “tortious conduct.”  
It is also likely that Congress did not specify an extraterritorial 
application of ATS within the statute because it did not think that it had 
to. The mention of the law of nations should be sufficient to infer an 
extraterritorial application. In fact, Justice Breyer133 would allow 
 
 130. Described as the focus test in Morrison but referred to as the touch and concern test in 
Kiobel. 
 131. Although they never do state that factors to be considered, only that the focus is one viable 
option. 
 132. Hanoch Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 517 F. Supp. 542, 548 (1981). 
 133. In his Kiobel concurrence, joined by Justice’s Ginsberg, Sotomayer, and Kagan. 
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jurisdiction whenever: (1) the alleged tort occurs on American soil; (2) 
when the defendant is an American national; or (3) when the 
defendant’s conduct substantially and adversely affects an important 
American national interest.134 While Kiobel disallows jurisdiction on the 
ground that mere corporate presence is allegedly not sufficient to bring 
an ATS claim, any direction or call made by a U.S. corporation on U.S. 
soil should suffice to kick-start a cause of action under the ATS. The 
literal meaning of “touch and concern” implies that each of these three 
scenarios is enough to displace the presumption. If Congress intended 
the focus of a statute or the claims made to “touch and concern” the U.S. 
with sufficient force to displace the presumption, they would have either 
written the statute more narrowly, or provided legislative history to 
indicate that is how the ATS is meant to be applied. 
The presumption against extraterritoriality can be described as a 
rather recent canon of statutory interpretation. It was born into civil 
procedure in the 1909 American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co. case, 
when the court stated, “[a]ll legislation is prima facie territorial.”135 It is 
probable that the Supreme Court was unaware of what a discord those 
six words of dicta would cause over a century later. Even though it has 
been over one hundred years since the first discussion of the 
presumption, it can still be said to be a relatively recent phenomenon 
due to the relatively slow progression of the legal system.  
The Supreme Court has no business applying this relatively recent 
phenomenon to statute that existed almost a century and a half before it. 
In other words, it is inappropriate to apply a canon of statutory 
construction, born in 1909, to a statute that has been in existence since 
1789. The argument that if Congress intended the statute to apply 
extraterritorially, they would have explicitly included it, becomes 
essentially illegitimate when considering that members of Congress, 
who wrote the ATS, were unaware of how the legal system would 
interpret this statute centuries later. It is only fair to interpret the ATS as 
having an extraterritorial aspect because it mentions, on its face, the law 
of nations. That alone should be enough to indicate that those in 1789 
meant for it to apply extraterritorially. Going against the statutes stated 
purpose and its textual reading, both in existence of centuries, to apply a 
canon of construction that did not come into existence until over one 
hundred years later, a canon that effectively has to the power to negate 
the statute, is an improper interpretation of the law. 
By reading the presumption into each and every statute that Congress 
does not specifically state applies abroad, the court is creating too many 
 
 134. Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 127. 
 135. 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909). 
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bright line rules that may often go against the exact purpose of a statute. 
Furthermore, stating that the focus of the statute is the sole consideration 
in determining whether the presumption is displaced, makes the line 
even brighter. This cannot be a correct application because a statute can 
be read to have many foci. Then, the issue becomes: which focus 
governs? When determining the answer, legislative history should 
indicate the priority of a statute’s adoption. When that is not available, it 
is inappropriate to allude to a narrow application, something which both 
the Supreme Court and numerous circuit courts have done in the past.  
The Supreme Court, in its three most recent cases addressing a 
statute’s extraterritorial application, contradicts itself numerous times 
when it discusses explicit displacement of the presumption and the 
conduct and focus of a statute. Dissenting in part in Adhikari, Judge 
Graves stated: 
 
“[t]he majority then reasons that the ‘ATS “focus” analysis’ 
involves examining “the conduct alleged to constitute violations 
of the law of nations, and the location of that conduct.”136I have 
no issue with this broad proposition; however, it is not simple 
matter to apply it to a case, such as this one, where the alleged 
conduct is comprised of several constituent actions that are part 
of an overall course of conduct constituting a violation of the law 
of nations.”137 
 
If the court only looks to one factor, its determined “focus” of a 
statute, it is doing a disservice to those seeking to utilize the statute to 
remedy an international wrong. By looking only at what it declares the 
“focus” to be, and thus likely only look at one specific act, the court is 
turning a blind eye to all other claims in front of it, all of which are 
likely stemming from multiple and potentially even separate events. 
In his Morrison concurrence, Justice Breyer stated that with the ATS 
language adopted, “Congress invited an expansive role for judicial 
elaboration when it crafted such an open-ended statute in 1934.”138 
While Justice Breyer concurred in judgment, he disagreed with the 
majorities turning of the presumption from a flexible rule into more of a 
clear statement of law.139 In his discussion of the presumption, he 
referenced EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco),140 where 
Justice Rehnquist stated “Congress’ awareness of the need to make a 
 
 136. Adhikari, 845 F.3d at 208 (quoting Mastafa, 770 F.3d at 185). 
 137. Id. 
 138. 561 U.S. at 276. 
 139. Id. at 278. 
 140. EEOC, 499 U.S. 244 at 258. 
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clear statement that a statute applies overseas is amply demonstrated by 
the numerous occasions on which it has expressly legislated the 
extraterritorial application of the statute.”141 Justice Marshall vigorously 
disagreed with that statement, arguing that “ . . . this canon is not a 
‘clear statement’ rule, the application of which relieves a court of the 
duty to give effect to all available indicia of the legislative will.”142  
From Aramco, Justice Breyer deduces that “ . . . our cases both before 
and after Aramco make perfectly clear that the Court continues to give 
effect to ‘all available evidence about the meaning’ of a provision when 
considering its extraterritorial application, lest we defy congress’ 
will.”143 He concludes that the presumption can be useful as a theory of 
congressional purpose, a tool for managing international conflict, a 
background norm, a tiebreaker, but it does NOT relieve courts of the 
duty to give statutes the most faithful reading possible.144 This statement 
indicates that he believes the presumption to be one of many pieces in 
analyzing extraterritorial applicability. While Congress’ purpose is to 
legislate domestically, that should not be a sole or even a strong reason 
for concluding that the ATS does not apply extraterritorially, especially 
where there is explicit mention of international law within the statutory 
text, and absolutely no mention or indication that the statute does not 
apply to conduct that has taken place out of the U.S. Reading “the law of 
nations” to apply only to activity occurring inside of the U.S. is, in itself, 
contradictory. 
B. The Lone Dissenter 
Judge Graves dissent145 in Adhikari touches on numerous factors that 
point to why a bright line rule regarding the ATS needs to be 
established. Graves believes that the majority “adopts an unnecessarily 
restrictive view as to the meaning of Kiobel’s ‘touch and concern’ 
language by engaging in a formalistic application of Morrison’s focus 
test.”146 He believes that the plaintiffs stated a cause of action, with 
claims that “touch and concern” the U.S. with sufficient force, thus 
allowing a for viable ATS claim to be brought.147 The alleged violations 
related specifically to conduct being directed from the U.S., attempts to 
 
 141. 561 U.S. at 278. 
 142. Id. at 279. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. at 280. 
 145. Judge Graves dissented in part, concurred in part. His concurrence was only in relation to 
non-ATS claims. 
 146. 845 F.3d at 208 (J. Graves dissent). 
 147. Id. 
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U.S. personnel to cover that conduct up, and also allegations that the 
defendant and other U.S. corporations were directly benefiting from the 
international law violations.148 He further goes on to state that “the 
majority’s application of the ‘focus’ test belies the actual focus of the 
ATS and is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s ATS 
jurisprudence.”149 
Judge Graves’ recitation that the Fifth Circuit’s application the ATS, 
both generally and extraterritorially, belies what the statute was meant to 
accomplish in 1789, is refreshing. While voicing that he thinks the 
majority got it wrong, he perhaps takes his analysis too far by stating 
that the Fifth Circuit’s analysis in “inconsistent with the Supreme 
Court’s ATS jurisprudence.” It is difficult for the Fifth Circuit’s entire 
ATS opinion to be inconsistent with the Supreme Court, when the 
Supreme Court itself has contradicted itself numerous times over the last 
decade, each new opinion adding a layer to the ATS analysis that does 
not always make logical sense. However, while Judge Graves may have 
exaggerated a bit, he correctly states that the Fifth Circuit got its 
analysis wrong, specifically when it decided whether the claims stated, 
“touch and concern” the U.S. with sufficient force to displace the 
presumption. 
 Judge Graves backs his assertions by looking at the political climate 
prior to ATS enactment, proving that the ATS was and is not meant to 
only apply to a narrow set of situations, operated by a bright line rule.150 
He reiterates the concern for foreign relations and cites to Kiobel’s 
language that the purpose of the ATS was to address “violations of the 
law of nations, admitting of a judicial remedy and, at the same time, 
threatening serious consequences in international affairs.”151 “Prior to 
the enactment of the ATS, Congress was frustrated by the federal 
government’s incapacity to vindicate rights under the law of nations.”152 
Congress’ annoyance with the lack of enforcement power prior to the 
ATS’s enactment would not lead them to legislate narrowly. If anything, 
this attitude would have led them to desire a broad reading of the statute, 
likely a reason why instead of going into detail, they left the statute to 
simply state: “the law of nations.” 
 
 148. Id. at 216-17. 
 149. Id. at 208. 
 150. Congress’ desire to put legislation in place allowing them to deal with international issues 
was intensified by the Marbois incident, May 1784. See Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. 111 
(1784). Discussed in 542 U.S. 692. 
 151. 845 F.3d at 210. 
 152. Id. 
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C. A Limitation of the Fourth Circuit’s Analysis 
While a multi-factor test to decide an extraterritorial application of 
ATS should be the correct analysis for a claim, this test cannot go 
without limitation. A major concern that comes with applying the ATS 
broadly is the issue of the U.S. having too much police power. If the 
U.S. is able to bring those from abroad to the U.S. to try them for 
international wrongs against other foreign individuals, controversy 
might ignite. 
As a result, it would be most beneficial for foreign citizens to be able 
to state a cause of action under the ATS for crimes committed in 
violation of international law by U.S. citizens or U.S. based 
corporations. ATS should be used as an avenue for the U.S. to hold 
these citizens and corporations accountable for violations of the laws of 
nations occurring in the U.S. and abroad. If a U.S. citizen or corporation 
violates the law of nations in another country, either by funneling money 
to an organization, person, or operation or by providing personnel to 
carry out or instruct others to carry out a violation, they should not have 
to be extradited to that country to be held accountable for their actions. 
Those, or their family members, who have suffered the violation should 
be able to choose a forum when seeking a remedy, and the ATS should 
be the vehicle for it.  
If the situation is reversed and a U.S. citizen is the victim of a 
violation of the law of nations, the line becomes more blurred. One 
possible method of redress would be attempting to bring suit abroad, if 
possible, to avoid any conflict of laws. If there is no available remedy, a 
U.S. citizen, suffering from a violation of the law of nations committed 
abroad, should seek an application of the ATS. In the event that a court 
would allow a case such a this to proceed, there would need to be some 
sort of procedure in place to attempt to avoid conflicting laws, and to 
ultimately prevent forum shopping and other potential issues. 
While some sort of limitation is necessary on ATS cases, this 
limitation should be decided on a case by case basis.153 It is impossible 
to foresee all potential issues that may arise in allowing a broad 
application of the ATS, but the fear alone should not foreclose plaintiffs 
from bringing suit under the statute. 
D. Al Shimari Satisfies RJR’s Test 
Regardless of whether the Fourth Circuit takes a unique approach to 
the extraterritorial component of the ATS by applying a multi-factor 
 
 153. Potentially in an analogous fashion to a forum non conviens issue. See Piper v. Reno, 454 
U.S. 235 (1981). 
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test, the Fourth Circuit still has a case that is, or should be read, to be 
compliant with the test last enunciated by the Supreme Court in RJR. 
As previously stated it can be said that ATS displaces the 
presumption against extraterritoriality by explicitly mentioning in a 
statute “the law of nations” or a similar variation. However, even if a 
court were to disagree, the court is forced to move to step two of the 
RJR test, which looks at what activity occurred domestically and the 
extent necessary to allow a case to proceed. Employment and orders 
were both directed from the U.S. The fact that the orders and funds were 
coming from the U.S. in this scenario should be sufficient to permissibly 
apply the ATS. Even if the torture itself was not occurring in the U.S., 
the orders themselves were being directed by U.S. officials, in the U.S. 
While the language of ATS is broad, so is the language of RJR’s 
enunciated test. A permissible application of the second part of the test 
can and should be read to encompass any activity stemming from or 
relating to the alleged tortious conduct. The same analysis should be 
conducted in Adhikari, and it should come out the same way. In short, 
application of the RJR test in both Adhikari and Al Shimari should lead 
to a finding of a permissible extraterritorial application of ATS. 
E. An ATS Analysis Going Forward 
While the Supreme Court has spoken on the presumption against 
extraterritoriality generally, and also specifically in terms of the ATS, 
there has still been a clear disagreement on what the test is and how it 
should be applied. Though the Supreme Court declined to hear Adhikari, 
it granted certiorari to Jesner v Arab Bank154 to determine whether 
corporations may be held liable under the ATS. The Supreme Court’s 
April 2018 decision, however, failed to provide the clarity needed for 
the judiciary to more accurately apply the ATS going forward.155 Jesner 
provided an opportunity for the Supreme Court to clarify whether the 
focus of the statute is essentially the only inquiry into whether an ATS 
claim can successfully be brought, or whether a multi-factor analysis is 
more appropriate, with potential factors including: substantial 
connections to the U.S., headquarters based in the U.S., etcetera. A 
multi-faceted analysis is a more viable option to consider whether a 
claim sufficiently “touch[es] and concern[s]” the U.S. However, the 
Supreme Court failed to contemplate a parallel analysis in Jesner. 
 In Jesner, petitioners argued that the Arab Bank provided financial 
services to various terrorist groups, thus allowing for attacks to occur in 
 
 154. In re Arab Bank, PLC Alien Tort Statute Litig., 808 F.3d 144 (2015). 
 155. Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S.Ct. 1386 (2018).   
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foreign nations.156 In a 5-4 decision, Justice Kennedy, writing for the 
majority, focused the opinion on a history of the ATS and the Court’s 
decision in Sosa, before ultimately concluding that the judiciary lacked 
the power to find corporate liability within the ATS. Instead, the 
majority, again, stated that it is not within the judiciary’s purview to 
clarify the scope of the ATS, but rather that the task lies with 
Congress.157 Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justices Ginsberg, Breyer, 
and Kagan, dissented, stating that “[t]he text, history, and purpose of the 
ATS, as well as the long and consistent history of corporate liability in 
tort, confirm that tort law claims for law-of-nations violations may be 
brought against corporations under the ATS.”158 The dissenting Justices 
correctly realized the danger of failing to recognize corporate liability in 
human rights violations cases. Not only would recognizing corporate 
liability in human rights violations cases benefit survivors and their 
beneficiaries, but by holding banks and corporations liable for their 
actions, those banks and corporations are likely to increase the policing 
of their customers and are more likely to catch anything out of the 
ordinary, before it is too late, in fear of being scolded and/or fined by the 
U.S. government.  Should the Supreme Court fail to continue to clarify 
the application of the ATS, confusion will continue to spread. With the 
increased amount of terrorism occurring through the world, it is 
important that the Supreme Court come up with a clear answer or even a 
viable test for those that have been victims of violations of the law of 
nations, occurring outside of the U.S. by U.S. citizens or corporations. If 
the Supreme Court voices that the focus of the statute is not the sole test, 
many more potential doors open for victims and their families.  Rather 
than continuing to look at the legislature, the Supreme Court should join 
Justice Sotomayor’s dissent, revisit the ATS’s application, and deliver a 
viable analysis. 
The Supreme Court’s finding that corporations cannot be held liable 
under the ATS, is not the end-all-be-all of ATS claims. The Supreme 
Court’s failure to recognize corporate liability in the ATS context does 
not serve as a categorial bar to individuals seeking redress, rather such 
individuals must jump over more hurdles to bring suit. While corporate 
liability does not exist directly under the ATS, potential litigation is not 
foreclosed because the officers and employees of the corporations can 
still be held accountable for their actions in an individual or employment 
related capacity, making indemnification the probable result. 
 
 156. In re Arab Bank, 808 F.3d at 149. 
 157. Jesner, 138 S.Ct. at 1402. 
 158. Id. at 1419 (Sotomayor, J. dissenting). 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Going forward, it would be wise for the Supreme Court to clarify the 
test, not only for applying the ATS generally, but for analyzing 
extraterritoriality.159 While a multi-factor test is the right path to follow, 
it is important to be wary of any potential conflicts of law and the risks 
associated with the U.S. over policing international law or the law of 
nations–making it important that the Court implement a limitation. 
While it is necessary for the Supreme Court to enunciate a bright line 
rule when it comes to the extraterritorial application of the ATS, the rule 
itself should not be a bright line. 
 
 
 159. One that should be aligned with the Fourth Circuit’s interpretation to yield the statute’s 
intended results. 
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